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James Loxley, University of Edinburgh 
 
‘Not Sure of Safety’: Hobbes and Exile 
 
No paradox of contemporary politics is filled with a more poignant irony than 
the discrepancy between the efforts of those well-meaning idealists who 
stubbornly insist on regarding as ‘inalienable’ those human rights, which are 
enjoyed only by citizens of the most prosperous and civilized countries, and 
the situation of the rightless themselves.1 
 
‘The Decline of the Nation-State and the End of the Rights of Man’, a 
central chapter in Hannah Arendt’s Origins of Totalitarianism, sets out one of 
the book’s continuing provocations. Meditating on the fate the shifting and 
various mass of exiles generated in mid-twentieth century Europe, Arendt 
discerns perplexities. The exile, stripped of his or her civil rights, should have 
stood revealed as an individual endowed with inalienable human rights, and 
therefore capable of making a legitimate claim for recognition on the modern 
European polity which proclaims its fidelity to such notions. But this had not 
happened. Instead, ‘those whom the persecutor had singled out as scum of 
the earth – Jews, Trotskyites, etc. – actually were received as scum of the 
earth everywhere; those whom persecution had called undesirable became 
the indésirables of Europe.’2 Far from being embraced as fellows by the 
peoples to whom they looked for refuge, exiles carried their stigma with them. 
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They found themselves as estranged from the rights of man as they were from 
those of the citizen when they were stopped at borders or interned in camps. 
So for Arendt, the stateless refugee ‘has been forced outside the pale of the 
law’, and in that movement shows up an anomaly or awkwardness in our 
sense that human and civil rights are necessarily complementary or mutually 
reinforcing.3 Inalienable, natural rights have turned out to be unenforceable 
‘whenever people appeared who were no longer the citizens of any sovereign 
state’.4 To be expelled from a polity, to be forced to fall back on one’s 
humanity, is in fact to be expelled from a humanity that turns out to be co-
extensive with citizenship, and at the same time to be reduced to a humanity 
which is both the ground of right and a mark of its withdrawal. As Arendt puts 
it, ‘a man who is nothing but a man has lost the very qualities which make it 
possible for other people to treat him as a fellow-man’.5 The exile’s condition 
is thus one of ‘abstract nakedness’, or ‘mere existence,’ a life lived as a body 
or a natural datum; but it is also a condition in which this givenness is 
juridically visible, since rights are supposed to inhere in us on account of our 
irreducible, universal, natural humanity. This is the source of the perplexity. 
Arendt’s formulation of this perplexity has been taken up by a number 
of thinkers intent on the somewhat suspicious examination of the rhetoric of 
human rights.6 But perhaps the most influential recent work to follow explicitly 
from Arendt’s discussion has been that of the Italian philosopher Giorgio 
Agamben. For Agamben, the perplexing condition of the stateless exile is just 
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one example of a more generally queasy modern politics of the natural, a 
politics that produces the figure of ‘bare life’ as the disruption and 
displacement – but also disavowed condition – of modern citizenship.7 
Agamben therefore extends Arendt’s analysis, locating the problem not just in 
the challenge posed to the Western conjunction of man and citizen by the 
streams of refugees created in twentieth century Europe, but more 
fundamentally in Western discourses of sovereignty and the state. In this, for 
Agamben, Thomas Hobbes is implicated, despite the radical differences 
between Hobbesian and Arendtian conceptions of law and right. This is partly 
because Agamben’s analysis of sovereignty engages with the theoretical 
account offered by the reactionary German jurist Carl Schmitt, who saw 
himself as developing Hobbesian ideas.8 But it is also because Agamben 
follows theorists such as Leo Strauss and Norberto Bobbio in seeing 
Hobbes’s political philosophy as centrally concerned to articulate the relation 
between the status civilis and the status naturalis, as therefore thinking civility 
through its limits, and seeking to test the relationship between different kinds 
or moments of nature and right.9 Clearly, it makes sense to suggest that in 
Hobbes the political significance of the relationship between nature and civility 
is very much to the point, and therefore the whole political constitution of the 
human is at issue; yet identifying this significance is not always the easiest or 
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most uncontroversial move. Hobbes stresses both the continuities and the 
disjunctions between natural and civil right and law: the weighty transition – 
and also caesura – between chapters 13 and 14 of Leviathan can serve as an 
exemplary instance of this. Agamben suggests that Hobbes’s thinking of right, 
and of the political human, is not so much an articulation of the civil and the 
natural as the awkward and mutual implication of the one within the other. For 
Hobbes, he suggests, sovereign power ‘presents itself as an incorporation of 
the state of nature in society, or, if one prefers, as a state of indistinction 
between nature and culture, between violence and law… Exteriority – the law 
of nature and the principle of the preservation of one’s own life – is truly the 
innermost centre of the political system, and the political system lives off it’.10 
While there may be a bit too much of Schmittian decisionism in his account of 
sovereignty, even without this influence Hobbes’s thought is marked for 
Agamben by the kind of conceptual awkwardness – paradox, almost - that 
Arendt locates in the modern thinking and practice of rights. 
Despite the fact that his own work on bare life is indebted to the 
Foucauldian conception of biopolitics, Agamben here displays the distance 
between his own account and that of his predecessor. Foucault, following 
Hobbes’s own comment on his project, sees him as one of the Capitolian 
geese ‘that with their noyse defended those within it, not because they were 
they, but because they were there’.11 For Foucault, Hobbes is accounted ‘the 
father of political philosophy’ because he is the staunch defender of 
‘philosophico-juridical discourse’, a paradigmatic instance of the desire to 
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maintain the language of right as the explanatory matrix for all human, social 
relations. For Agamben, though, as for Arendt, it is precisely the desire to 
articulate right beyond the bounds of the polis that produces, despite itself, 
only paradoxically juridical figures, and indeed also summons up that political 
other of a philosophy of right which Foucault sees Hobbes as aiming to 
suppress. Both Arendt and Agamben see the exile as one of the figures for 
this predicament, and the latter also relates this figure, briefly, to the 
Hobbesian account of sovereignty.12 Following such hints in the context of 
more mainstream readings of Hobbes, this essay explores the nature and 
extent of any perplexity manifested in the solitary, poor, insecure exile. 
 
1. Hobbes in Exile; Exile in Hobbes 
 
The significance of exile for Hobbes is peculiarly bound up with his 
biography. Hobbes’s sojourn in France between 1640 and 1651 certainly 
looks like an exile, and is described as such by a recent biographer.13 The 
account Hobbes gave others supports the suggestion that this was not an 
unforced relocation. Aubrey notes that ‘he told me that Bishop Manwaring (of 
St David’s) preach’t his doctrine; for which, among others, he was sent 
prisoner to the Tower. Then thought Mr Hobbes, ’tis time now for me to shift 
for my selfe, and so withdrew into France’.14 The same suggestion is made in 
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Hobbes’s own prose autobiography: having realised that civil war was 
approaching in late 1640, concerned for his safety, he returned to his friends 
in France.15 His fears were not groundless: Hobbes’s name, says Noel 
Malcolm, ‘was … in circulation as a hardline theorist of royal absolutism’.16 
Roger Maynwaring was among the most notorious of such theorists, and 
during the Short Parliament moves were made to reopen a Parliamentary 
case against him that the King had managed to head off twelve years earlier: 
the fear that the treatment Maynwaring had endured in 1628 for promulgating 
his views was about to be dished out not only to him but also to those with 
similarly elevated views of royal power, and that the King would not be able to 
protect his apologists as he had in prior troubles, is what brought him to 
Hobbes’s mind now.17 The prospect of aggressive moves against those who 
preached ‘for absolute monarchy that the king may do as he list’, raised again 
when the Long Parliament convened in November 1640, appears to have 
finally decided Hobbes.18 Yet a stay in France was probably already planned, 
and was in large part a welcome resumption of a treasured friendship with 
Marin Mersenne at a point when Hobbes’s main English patron, the Earl of 
Newcastle, was preoccupied with affairs of state.19 As Malcolm suggests, ‘with 
Newcastle distracted by politics, the prospects of a period of quiet study in 
Newcastle's household had receded; Mersenne's Paris thus became the most 
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natural and alluring alternative’.20 Hobbes in 1640 was perhaps not best 
classed as a refugee. 
Yet the situation, according to Hobbes at least, was worse eleven years 
later. In his Latin autobiographies he suggests that his departure from France 
in 1652 did not constitute the end of exile but was actually the response to a 
banishment that made him a stateless refugee. Criticised at the exiled Stuart 
court for positions maintained in Leviathan that were allegedly contrary to 
royal interests, he found himself ‘banished [prohibitus] from the King’s 
household’: 
 
Stripped of the King’s protection [protectione regia destitutus], and fearing 
malicious attacks by Roman clerics whose teachings he had successfully 
attacked, he had little option other than to take refuge [coactus sit refugere] in 
England.21 
 
Or, as he put it in his verse autobiography (in the English of the anonymous 
1680 translation): 
 
When that Book [i.e., Leviathan] was perus’d by knowing Men, 
The Gates of Janus Temple opened then; 
And they accus’d me to the King, that I 
Seem’d to approve Cromwel’s Impiety, 
And countenance the worst of Wickedness: 
This was believ’d, and I appear’d no less 
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Than a Grand Enemy [adversis in partibus], so that I was for’t 
Banish’d  both the King’s Presence and his Court 
[Perpetuo jubeor Regis abesse domo]. 
Then I began on this to Ruminate 
On Dorislaus, and on Ascham’s Fate, 
And stood amazed, like a poor Exile 
[Tanquam proscripto terror ubique aderat], 
Encompassed with Terrour all the while… 
Then home I came, not sure of safety there, 
Though I cou’d not be safer any where.22 
 
Where Maynwaring’s example had been the worrying precedent in 1640, now 
the fate of two representatives of the new commonwealth murdered abroad by 
royalist assassins looms threateningly large. Here, Hobbes describes himself 
as akin to an exile not because he shifts abroad, but because he has been 
deprived of protection and rendered newly and starkly vulnerable. The Stuart 
court in exile is itself a little commonwealth, and once ordered to leave 
Hobbes has no choice but to seek safety wherever he could reasonably hope 
to find it. 
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9 
 Of course, this version of his return to England was written some years 
after the fact, and there is evidence to suggest that it is intended to excuse its 
author from the persistent accusation that he willingly abandoned the Stuart 
cause in the early 1650s. Edward Hyde, Earl of Clarendon, claimed not only 
that Hobbes wrote Leviathan to appease the English Republican authorities 
and thus facilitate his return, but that he confessed as much at the time.23 
Malcolm points to indications that, like the flight to France in 1640, this journey 
too was substantially premeditated and not a response to a sudden crisis.24 
Nevertheless, this identification of his own plight with that of the exile, and the 
indication that this might have an exculpatory function, points to the 
connection that could be drawn between Hobbes’s personal circumstances or 
interests and his political theory. When Hobbes is seeking to justify his own 
conduct, we might reasonably expect him to do so in a manner that is 
consistent with the normative framework of his own thought. In which case, 
Hobbes’s claim to have suffered the condition of the exile can only be made 
fully comprehensible in relation to the place of that condition in his civil 
science. 
 Exile is mentioned in each of the major works of political theory that 
Hobbes produced, and its handling is consistent across them. In The 
Elements of Law, the topic first arises at the end of chapter XXI, at the point 
when Hobbes is completing his discussion of the kinds of commonwealth by 
institution, polities produced by a group of people through the consensual 
creation of a new civil state. Having considered ‘how particular men enter into 
subjection’, Hobbes says, ‘it followeth to consider how such subjection may be 
                                                          
23
 Edward Hyde, Earl of Clarendon, A Brief View and Survey of the Dangerous and Pernicious 
Errors to Church and State, In Mr. Hobbes’s Book, Entitled Leviathan (Oxford, 1676), 8. 
24
 Malcolm, Aspects, 19-20. 
10 
discharged’.25 One of the ways in which subjection as such may be dissolved 
is ‘exile perpetual, … forasmuch as being out of the protection of the 
sovereignty that expelled him, [the exile] hath no means of subsisting but from 
himself’ (EL XXI, 14, 125). Interestingly, this brief definition of exile is paired 
with another instance of dissolved subjection: ‘Likewise, a man is released of 
his subjection by conquest’ (EL XXI, 14, 125). The situation of the exile and 
that of the conquered man are similar for Hobbes, but he says little here about 
the reasons for aligning them in this fashion. The issue arises again a few 
paragraphs later, though, in the following chapter’s handling of ‘dominion, or a 
body politic by acquisition’ (EL XXII, 1, 126). Once again, exile is treated in 
conjunction with a handling of conquest. Hobbes here seeks to define the 
condition of the discharged servant, claiming specifically that ‘servants … are 
discharged of their servitude or subjection in the same manner that subjects 
are released of their allegiance in a commonwealth institutive’ (EL XXII, 7, 
128). Unsurprisingly, exile is the same kind of forced release from subjection 
in this context as in its earlier appearance: ‘no more but manumission given to 
a servant, not in the way of benefit, but punishment’ (EL XXII, 7, 128). But 
again, some of the conditions that Hobbes then chooses to align with exile are 
noteworthy. He claims that ‘new captivity’ is equally a necessary end of prior 
bonds, before going on to argue that a servant who ‘is no longer trusted, but 
committed to his chains and custody, is thereby discharged of the obligation in 
foro interno, and therefore if he can get loose, may lawfully go his way’ (EL 
XXII, 7, 128-9). 
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 In The Elements of Law, then, exile features as one of a number of 
related conditions in which the fundamental civil bond of subjection is 
cancelled: exiles are likened to those conquered by enemies and prisoners, all 
equally exposed and vulnerable to physical force, stripped of civil personality 
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state of nature has the same relation to the civil state, i.e. liberty has the same 
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happen in two ways: either by permission, as when one gets leave and 
voluntarily departs to live elsewhere, or by command, as an Exile.27 
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So exile is associated here with those occasions on which natural liberty, the 
desiring, animal condition opposed to ‘the civil state’, reasserts itself. And 
while the name of exile applies only to those who have been banished, it is 
also related to the condition of someone who voluntarily seeks to live beyond 
the boundaries of the state in which s/he is a subject. In both cases this 
subjection comes undone, even if the mantle is immediately reassumed in the 
polity to which the exile goes. 
 In Leviathan, the picture is complicated a little further. Exile appears 
twice, first – tellingly – in chapter XXI, ‘Of the Liberty of Subjects’, and then in 
more detail during the discussion of punishment in chapter XXVIII. In the first 
case it once again features on a list of the ways in which subjection can be 
dissolved. Captivity in war, or conquest by an enemy, strip a person of their 
subjection, as does a sovereign’s abdication. Hobbes then states that ‘If the 
Soveraign Banish his Subject; during the Banishment, he is not Subject’, here 
differentiating the exile from someone who ‘is sent on a message, or hath 
leave to travel’.28 These latter voyagers retain their subjection through a kind 
of exchange agreement between sovereigns; the former, entering ‘anothers 
dominion’, is immediately liable to subjection to the place’s master. Then, in 
his discussion of punishment, Hobbes spells out the thinking condensed in his 
basic definitions of exile in The Elements, De Cive, and earlier in Leviathan: 
 
Exile, (Banishment) is when a man is for a crime, condemned to depart out of 
the dominion of the Common-wealth, or out of a certaine part thereof; and 
during a prefixed time, or for ever, not to return into it: and seemeth not in its 
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own nature, without other circumstances, to be a Punishment; but rather an 
escape, or a publique commandement to avoid Punishment by flight. And 
Cicero sayes, there was never any such Punishment ordained in the City of 
Rome; but cals it a refuge of men in danger. For if a man banished, be 
neverthelesse permitted to enjoy his Goods, and the Revenue of his Lands, 
the meer change of ayr is no Punishment; nor does it tend to that benefit of 
the Common-wealth, for which all Punishments are ordained, (that is to say, to 
the forming of mens wils to the observation of the Law;) but many times to the 
dammage of the Common-wealth. For a Banished man, is a lawfull enemy of 
the Common-wealth that banished him; as being no more a member of the 
same. But if he be withal deprived of his Lands, or Goods, then the 
Punishment lyeth not in the Exile, but is to be reckoned amongst Punishments 
pecuniary. (L, XXVIII, 218) 
 
Here, then, the implications of living beyond the dissolution of one’s subjection 
are clarified. Hobbes aligns himself with one side of a long debate in asserting 
that exile itself is not a punishment, because punishment happens to those 
subject to the civil law, whereas exiles exist beyond that law. With Cicero, 
Hobbes avers that exile may also be an escape from punishment, or a refuge 
from danger.29 Crucially, too, exile makes an enemy of someone who had 
been a subject, and is therefore contrary to the aim of punishment.  
Given this, it is perhaps unsurprising that Hobbes then goes on to 
describe in detail the condition of enmity itself, in which violence may 
legitimately be done to someone without recourse to the processes of positive 
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law. Against its enemies, the state may act with apparently vindictive 
savagery, and in doing so acts entirely in accord with natural law. Such 
enemies include ‘Subjects, who deliberatly deny the Authority of the Common-
wealth established’, or rebels: 
 
the nature of this offence, consisteth in the renouncing of subjection; which is 
a relapse into the condition of warre, commonly called Rebellion; and they that 
so offend, suffer not as Subjects, but as Enemies. For Rebellion, is but warre 
renewed. (L, XXVIII, 219) 
 
As a result of the subject’s or the sovereign’s actions, then, an instance of the 
war of all against all appears as a localised enmity. The state may kill rebels 
or traitors without reference to law, as the enemy is legally visible only as 
someone beyond its pale; consequently, the apparently juridical status of the 
exile and the traitor, and the apparently juridical violence to which they are 
exposed, are in fact not properly juridical at all. As Hobbes says, ‘Harme 
inflicted upon one that is a declared enemy, fals not under the name of 
Punishment’: 
 
If a subject shall by fact, or word, wittingly, and deliberatly deny the authority 
of the Representative of the Common-wealth, (whatsoever penalty hath been 
formerly ordained for Treason,) he may lawfully be made to suffer whatsoever 
the Representative will: For in denying subjection, he denies such Punishment 
as by the Law hath been ordained; and therefore suffers as an enemy of the 
Commonwealth; that is, according to the will of the Representative. For the 
15 
Punishments set down in the Law, are to Subjects, not to Enemies; such as 
are they, that having been by their own act Subjects, deliberately revolting, 
deny the Soveraign Power. (L, XXVIII, 216) 
  
This is a modification of the position that Hobbes sets out in different 
terms in chapter XIV of De Cive, where the crime of Lèse-Majesté is defined 
as a transgression of natural rather than civil law, but ‘rebels, traitors and 
others convicted of treason’ are nonetheless said  to be ‘punished not by civil 
right, but by natural right, i.e. not as bad citizens but as enemies of the 
commonwealth, and not by the right of government or dominion, but by the 
right of war’ (DC, XIV, 165-6). Here, punishment is still the appropriate name 
for this violence. And in chapter XXVII of Leviathan, the same crime is said in 
to be against fundamental law, itself earlier defined as a subdivision of civil 
rather than natural law; presumably then, on this basis, the violence inflicted 
would be a kind of punishment. (L, XXVI, 199-200, XXVII, 212). Later, in A 
Dialogue between a Philosopher and a Student, of the Common Laws of 
England, Hobbes argues forcefully against the opinion expressed by Edward 
Coke in his Institutes that the traitor and the enemy are fundamentally distinct. 
Coke deduced a fundamental difference in legal status for foreign and 
domestic enemies from the difference in treatment that would be meted out to 
them if they were captured together. Foreign enemies cannot be proceeded 
against as traitors; conversely, a domestic enemy in league with a foreign 
army would not be ransomed.30 Hobbes, though, complaining that ‘Sir Edw. 
Coke does seldom well distinguish when there are two divers Names for one 
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and the same thing’, reiterates his account of treason as a form of enmity.31 
He insists that a king may ‘Lawfully … kill a Man, by what Death soever 
without an Indictment, when it is manifestly proved he was his open Enemy’.32 
The ‘law’ with which this course of action is compatible is therefore specifically 
not a civil law. As Hobbes argues: 
 
For the Nature of Treason by Rebellion; is it not a return to Hostility? What 
else does Rebellion signifie? William the Conqueror Subdued this Kingdom; 
some he Killed; some upon promise of future obedience he took to Mercy, and 
they became his Subjects, and swore Allegiance to him; if therefore they 
renew the War against him, are they not again open Enemies; or if any of 
them lurking under his Laws, seek occasion thereby to kill him, secretly, and 
come to be known, may he not be proceeded against as an enemy, who 
though he had not Committed what he Design’d, yet had certainly a Hostile 
Design.33 
 
The differences between these accounts of the precise juridical status 
of the traitor perhaps derive from the fact that treason is a specific kind of 
enmity, based on the renunciation of the basic political relation, the contract 
on which the state and its juridical capacity was founded. A subject cannot 
renounce subjection and remain liable to treatment according to judicial 
proceedings, but this path to enmity does make treason a distinctive hostility. 
The traitor is marked by the after-image of subjection, and thus hovers on the 
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borders of the law as an ex-subject, his deprivation a chief element in his 
visibility. And the exile, as someone literally removed from the compass of the 
law, shares in this peculiar post-civil status. When Hobbes describes himself 
in his verse autobiography as appearing to be an adversary, ‘adversis in 
partibus’, to Charles II in 1651, he might be suggesting that he was merely 
perceived as an opponent in an informal sense. The more resonant words of 
his translator, which describe how he was perceived as ‘no less / Than a 
Grand Enemy’, are more accurately reflective of the categories of political 
status set out in his philosophy. The banishment he then suffers confirms, as 
much as it responds to, this apparent enmity: the exile and the traitor are both 
names for those who have outlived their subjection. 
At the same time, it is worth pausing to note the nature of the example 
for which Hobbes reaches when looking to illustrate the basis for his 
understanding of treason in A Dialogue. The primal scene to which treason 
reverts here is not the state of nature as such, or a war of all against all; it is 
instead a scene of conquest. In fact, the Hobbesian account of exile and 
enmity often presupposes the balance – or rather, imbalance – of forces that 
such a scene implies. Within such circumstances, the enemy in question is 
defeated and captive; the outsider or exile is confronted not with a wilderness 
but a powerful potential sovereign. Persistently seeing these figures in this 
context not only shapes Hobbes’s sense of their status; it also witnesses to 
the kinds of exigency that made their status more than a theoretical matter for 
him. 
 
2. Obliging the Outsider 
18 
 
 At the time of Leviathan’s completion and publication, the kind of 
dubious or shadowy quasi-subject represented by the vulnerable exile or 
defeated enemy was a particularly urgent locus of political concern. As a 
number historians of political thought and writing have argued in the last four 
decades, Hobbes’s third version of his civil science can be read illuminatingly 
in the context of the commonwealth’s demand that its citizens take an oath 
promising to obey England’s republican regime.34 That demand made a 
pressing issue of both the nature of political obligation and the ways in which 
a change of obligation might be justified, and it has been convincingly 
suggested that Hobbesian texts and arguments were influential in, and 
influenced by, the political controversy that followed. Hobbes’s potentially dry 
discussion of the basis and limits of subjection becomes, in this context, of 
immediate relevance to those disputing whether or not the subjects of the 
executed king can rightly transfer their allegiance to the regime that has 
succeeded him. Not, of course, that all those ex-subjects are exiles, exactly, 
but insofar as their subjection is now in question they are in an analogous 
position: their sovereign has lost his power to protect them, and some have 
been vanquished in war. In which case, Hobbes famously says, they may be 
absolved of their allegiance, and therefore of the obligation to obey that 
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constitutes it, because ‘the Obligation of Subjects to the Soveraign, is 
understood to last as long, and no longer, than the power lasteth, by which he 
is able to protect them’ (L, XXI, 153). Sovereignty is intended to be immortal, 
but for Hobbes it is always a matter of capacity or power as well as title, in 
which case, ‘in its own nature [it is] not only subject to violent death, by 
forreign war; but also through the ignorance, and passions of men, it hath in it, 
from the very institution, many seeds of a naturall mortality, by Intestine 
Discord’ (L, XXI, 153). So if sovereignty is mortal, and dies with its power to 
protect those who established it, then subjection too dissolves at the point 
when subjects find themselves without recourse to the protective power of 
their state. 
 The question animating the Engagement debate then arises: what 
ought those who have lost their sovereign to do? In his accounts of dominion 
and a commonwealth by acquisition Hobbes offers a picture that is particularly 
pertinent to the early 1650s; indeed, its pertinence is highlighted in the 
‘Review and Conclusion’ appended to Leviathan, and this applicability seems 
particularly to have riled his royalist enemies: Clarendon described it as ‘a sly 
address to Cromwell’, and suggested that Hobbes was thereby seeking to 
‘secure the People of the Kingdom … to acquiesce and submit to his Brutal 
Power’.35 The essentials of Hobbes’s view, though, are there in the Elements 
of Law – indeed, it was this text that Marchamont Nedham directly cited in 
Mercurius Politicus and in the second edition of his Case of the 
Commonwealth of England, Stated, to reinforce his arguments in favour of 
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obedience to the republic.36 In chapter XXII, Hobbes argues that ‘a servant 
taken in the wars’ and kept in chains owes nothing to his new master: he is a 
slave, owned by ‘right of conquest’, but in no way obliged to obey his 
conqueror (EL, XXII, 3, 127; 9, 129). However, servants who are permitted to 
move around are tied to their new masters by ‘no other bond but a supposed 
covenant’ (EL, XXII, 3, 127). They are therefore parties to an engagement of 
sorts, and while they continue to be their master’s property, they are 
nevertheless more than slaves. 
 This distinction between those servants who are merely physically 
bound and those who are subjects through a covenant of sorts carries through 
to De Cive. Hobbes expands on its implications in a parallel chapter of his 
Latin treatise where the process of constituting a commonwealth by 
acquisition is properly delineated. A person enters into this version of the 
political relation ‘if, on being captured or defeated in war or losing hope in 
one’s own strength, one makes (to avoid death) a promise to the victor or the 
stronger party, to serve him, i.e. to do all that he shall command’ (DC, VIII, 1, 
102-3). But some of the defeated fare differently. Not all captives are trusted 
to be set free from their bonds and make a promise, and if not they do not 
become obliged to obey their master: ‘for an obligation arises from an 
agreement, and there is no agreement without trust’ (DC, VIII, 3, 103). In 
Leviathan, this point is even more sharply stressed. Now, the emphasis is less 
on trust and much more firmly on the covenant. Hobbes distinguishes 
between the vanquished and the conquered: the former are merely defeated 
in war, and therefore in another’s power, whereas the latter are those among 
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the defeated who have consented to obey their vanquisher in return for life 
and protection: 
 
It is not therefore the Victory, that giveth the right of Dominion over the 
Vanquished, but his own Covenant. Nor is he obliged because he is 
conquered; that is to say, beaten, and taken, or put to flight; but because he 
commeth in, and Submitteth to the Victor. (L, XX, 141) 
 
Here, emphatically, Hobbes argues that the consent of an agreement or 
covenant underpins subjection. 
 In all these accounts of the commonwealth by acquisition, then, 
Hobbes places an emphasis on a fundamental political relation – juridical, in 
Foucault’s extended sense – that is an alternative to the sheer power that a 
victor possesses over those he has beaten. This is not, of course, the social 
contract of the commonwealth by institution, because it is a covenant between 
the sovereign and his subjects; nonetheless, it is enough to establish the 
conquered as subjects, with a subject’s liability to all the obligations and 
sanctions that come with participation in the polity. In setting consent at the 
heart of the process he is also bringing his account of dominion into line with 
contract theory. This emphasis on the covenant within dominion is also 
relevant to the Engagement debate, where what was being demanded was 
precisely an explicit promise of obedience to a new sovereign power. 
Interestingly, though, Hobbes’s account of how consent is given is developed 
in the ‘Review and Conclusion’ in a direction that clearly undermines the 
significance of a specific verbal promise or act of agreement. There he argues 
22 
that consent can be tacit, and might therefore be signalled merely by living 
openly under the protection of a power (L, ‘Review and Conclusion’, 485). 
 In fact, the centrality of consent to the process of becoming a subject is 
compromised more profoundly. From the evidence adduced above, those who 
live on beyond the dissolution of their polity, or beyond the meaningful 
continuance of their own bonds to a sovereign, are thereby absolved of their 
status as subjects. Seemingly, therefore, they are completely without any of 
the marks of civil subjection until such time as they contract, tacitly or 
expressly, with the dominating power. They are returned to the state of nature, 
and are presumably open to the obligations of the laws of nature that Hobbes 
sets out in describing the transition to the commonwealth by institution, 
obligations that are themselves other than the duties or responsibilities of a 
subject and are binding only in foro interno, ‘to a desire they should take 
place’ (L, XV, 110). But this sense of the circumstances faced by the 
vanquished, or those deprived of their sovereign in war, neglects their 
specificity. This is not a general return to the state of nature: it is, of course, 
the experience of a vulnerability to an existing power, and any account of the 
duties incumbent on the vulnerable here should take its bearings from 
Hobbes’s views on the nature of dominion.37 The consent of agreement or 
covenant, as we have seen, would seem to be vital, and Hobbes’s distinction 
in Leviathan between the vanquished and the conquered would make no 
sense if it were not; but as Kinch Hoekstra has demonstrated, Hobbes also 
appears to override this requirement elsewhere in his account of dominion, 
leading his contemporaries to argue that he derived an obligation for people to 
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obey a power, to become its subjects, merely because they cringed before its 
might. Hoekstra suggests that, ‘in passage after passage’ from The Elements 
of Law, De Cive and Leviathan, ‘Hobbes subscribes to some version of the 
thesis that sufficient power by itself confers the right to rule’.38 The implication 
of this, given Hobbes’s consistent claim that the rights of the sovereign and 
the duties of subjects are reciprocal, is that a power can make its objects 
subjects against their will, or rather, without their consent. This would suggest 
that the distinction between the vanquished and the conquered, slaves and 
servants, those held in chains and those trusted, is in danger of collapsing. 
Certainly, when Hobbes says in The Elements and De Cive that a master has 
‘right’ and ‘dominion’ over both his prisoners and his servants we might 
wonder what these terms mean, since they apply to possession regardless of 
the existence of any covenant (EL, XXII, 4, 127; DC, VIII, 5, 104). This might 
be thought to make Hobbes at this point a remorselessly de facto thinker, 
grounding right in power, and completely contradicting his emphasis on the 
fundamental constitutive role of agreement or covenant. 
 According to Hoekstra, resolving this problem requires attention to two 
features of Hobbes’s thinking. Firstly, there is a crucial distinction between the 
way in which ‘right’ applies in the absence of a commonwealth and its 
functioning within one. Only in the latter case does right entail obligation; in 
the former, everyone has a right over everyone else, and if one person is able 
to get another into his power he has merely managed to actualise a right that 
already existed.39 The victor’s right over the vanquished, therefore, is only the 
making concrete of an entitlement that everyone in a condition of hostility has 
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over potential opponents. The slave thus kept in chains is an unwilling party to 
this actualisation, and in no sense the subject of a corresponding obligation to 
obey his ‘rightful’ master. Yet Hobbes does also seem to suggest that rights 
entailing obligations can arise from power, and not only where the power in 
question is divine. This is more than a right of nature, since it involves an 
obligation to obey on the part of the powerless. How, then, is this reconciled 
with the requirement for consent? 
 Hoekstra’s answer sees Hobbes building on the notion of a consent 
given tacitly, a conception that already ensures that ‘consent is sometimes 
stretched vanishingly thin’. Beyond this, Hoekstra argues, we find an 
argument that ‘the covenant of obedience … can instead be attributed when a 
given will or intention can be understood or assumed’.40 Assuming that 
humans will do what is in their own best interests, they can be further 
assumed to consent to obey an overwhelming power rather than risk their 
lives in contesting it. The laws of nature would suggest that they ought to 
consent to do so; according to Hoekstra, Hobbes ends up arguing that ‘one 
has consented when one ought to have consented’, and thus a normative 
requirement becomes an assumed social fact.41 Such an intervention into the 
debate around the Engagement oath would not necessarily persuade anyone 
of an obligation to take it; rather, it would circumvent debate in pointing out the 
superfluity of any such explicit consent-giving. And such a doctrine would also 
emphasise the nature and extent of the exile’s quasi-subjecthood: to be free 
of one power, and to encounter another, would not leave exiles suspended in 
a state of natural right before their consent is signalled in words or deeds. 
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Instead, their subjection – their constitution as participants in a juridical 
network of reciprocal obligations and entitlements - would always be 
immanent in any situation in which they confronted a power capable of killing 
them that nonetheless offers them an alternative. The limit cases of the exile 
and the conquered make it abundantly clear that the subjection that appeared 
to depend on the exercised will of a rational agent, consciously choosing to 
step into the civility announced by agreement or contract, arises more 
basically from the physical vulnerability of the living – mortal – human. If the 
ex-subject appears primarily as the absence of civil status, then the subject is 
itself stalked by the bare humanity that generates civil status. 
 So it is perhaps not surprising to find Hoekstra setting out the ultimate 
implication of Hobbes’s line of argument in the claim that ‘all of the living have 
consented to the power over them, if there is one’.42 The individual without 
proximity to a superior power is not, though, the exception to this rule that 
Hoekstra has in mind: ‘the only people free of obligation to the present power 
are the dead (and slaves in shackles)’43. These parenthetical latter have not 
consented, and cannot be assumed to have consented, because they have 
not been offered life and protection by the victorious foe. No possible 
agreement has been put to them. They are instead frozen or suspended in the 
exilic vulnerability on which the possibility of politics depends, but out of which 
it spins the fabric of civility. Confined captives are to be grouped with the 
dead, free of obligation only and exactly to the extent that their natural powers 
are blocked, condemned to live a life-beyond-life as those who are always 
about to die. Exiles are haunted both by their lost subjection and, as Arendt 
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remarked, by the possibility – however momentary – that they will not find a 
new commonwealth in which they can become subjects once again. 
 
3. The Liberty of the Exile 
 
The language of obligation, though, is not the only lens through which 
Hobbes perceives the predicament of the exile, and it is not the only way in 
which this figure presents a potentially difficult image of political and natural 
life. Elsewhere in his work, instead of speaking of an obligation to obey –  
assumed or otherwise, normative or contractual – Hobbes describes the 
situation of the vulnerable in the following terms: 
 
If a Subject be taken prisoner in war; or his person, or his means of life be 
within the Guards of the enemy, and hath his life and corporall Libertie given 
him, on condition to be Subject to the Victor, he hath Libertie to accept the 
condition; and having accepted it, is the subject of him that took him. (L, XXI, 
154) 
 
In the ‘Review and Conclusion’, as part of his effort to clarify ‘in what point of 
time it is, that a Subject becomes obliged to the Conqueror’, he refers back to 
this element in his argument and resorts to the same terms: 
 
Therefore for farther satisfaction of men therein, I say, the point of time, 
wherein a man becomes subject to the Conqueror, is that point, wherein 
having liberty to submit to him, he consenteth, either by expresse words, or by 
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other sufficient sign, to be his Subject. When it is that a man hath the liberty to 
submit, I have shewed before in the end of the 21. Chapter. (L, ‘Review and 
Conclusion’, 484) 
 
For the Hobbes of Leviathan, then, the ex-subject is at liberty to 
consent to the rule of the power confronting him, and this emphasis makes a 
vigorously renewed appearance in later, more autobiographical writings. 
Responding to John Wallis in a ‘letter’ published in 1662, Hobbes sought to 
refute accusations that he betrayed his king in returning from France to 
England and submitting to the post-regicide regime.44 His defence invoked the 
account of political obligation and its limits that he had crafted in his treatises, 
with a particular focus on Leviathan since that was the text his critics 
suggested had been written primarily to justify his coat-turning. Hobbes 
counter-attacks by arguing that his political theory actually condemns those 
such as Wallis who had abandoned their obligation to obey Charles I, even 
when the king still had the capacity to protect them. Speaking of his own 
situation, he repeatedly insists that he was free of any obligation to the Stuarts 
when he returned to England. He suggests, tellingly, that having ‘gone over’ 
into French exile, he had then ‘been driven back again’.45 He also implicitly 
aligns his own case with that of the king’s loyal servants who, ‘having done 
their utmost endeavour to defend His Majesties Right and Person against the 
Rebels’, were subsequently ‘forced to compound with your Masters, and to 
promise Obedience for the saving of their Lives and Fortunes’.46 The nature of 
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the force here is unclear; Hobbes, though, follows this with a categorical 
statement in their (and his) defence: 
 
They that had done their utmost endeavour to perform their obligation to the 
King, had done all that they could be obliged unto; and were consequently at 
liberty to seek the safety of their Lives and Livelihood wheresoever, and 
without Treachery.47 
 
Citing his own words from the ‘Review and Conclusion’ to Leviathan, Hobbes 
repeatedly insists on this ‘liberty’ – seven times in five pages.48  
 What, then, is this liberty of the ex-subject or exile? Liberty, as a 
significant body of recent research has shown, is an important and heavily 
freighted term for Hobbes, yet views on its meaning and place in his thinking 
remain various.49 For Philip Pettit, the Hobbesian vision of liberty is bipartite, 
divided between ‘non-obligation’ on the one hand, and ‘non-obstruction’ on 
the other. Liberty in the former sense characterises the condition of those who 
are not bound by agreements to perform or refrain from certain actions, and 
Pettit suggests, following Annabel Brett, that here Hobbes’s usage converges 
on the late-Scholastic and post-Scholastic definition of ‘natural liberty’.50 
Natural liberty, in this account, is the freedom we possess when we are not 
yet bound by the kind of covenant that establishes society: in the state of 
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nature, therefore, we are not yet obliged to anyone, and fully in possession of 
our liberty. Pettit claims that this kind of liberty is described by Hobbes in 
Leviathan as natural right. It therefore denotes both a fundamental entitlement 
and, negatively, an absence of obligations as social facts, rather than as 
normative, in foro interno requirements. 51 Liberty as non-obstruction, by 
contrast, is a freedom from external impediments to the full exercise of our 
corporeal will and capacities. Whether or not we possess this kind of liberty is 
apparently a matter of natural or physical fact: a river constrained by banks or 
channels is denied the liberty to go where its powers would take it, and the 
liberty possessed by humans is fundamentally of the same kind (L, XXI, 145-
6). For the Hobbes of Leviathan this kind of liberty is identified as ‘Liberty in 
the proper sense’, or ‘the proper signification of the word’ (L, XXI, 147; XIV, 
91). 
In his account of the development of Hobbes’s thinking on freedom, 
Quentin Skinner has disputed the claim that natural liberty for Hobbes is 
fundamentally a concept of non-obligation.52 He suggests instead that 
Hobbes’s view of natural right, and indeed of liberty more generally, is multi-
faceted, encompassing the juridical language of entitlements, the negative 
theory of freedom from obligations, and a sensitivity to the extent of and 
impediments to an agent’s powers to act. The primary significance of 
Hobbes’s accounts of liberty lies in their attempts to resignify the term in the 
face of his opponents’ political rhetoric. Such attempts reach a climax in 
chapter XXI of Leviathan, where Hobbes takes it upon himself to recast the 
potent republican or neo-Roman notion of the ‘free-man’ in his own terms. In 
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asserting that the subjects of the Leviathan are as free as the citizens of a 
republic, Hobbes draws on all aspects of his definition of liberty to make his 
case. He insists that ‘A FREE-MAN, is he, that in those things, which by his 
strength and wit he is able to do, is not hindred to doe what he has a will to’ 
(L, XXI, 146). In demonstrating that this is true of the Hobbesian subject and 
the republican citizen alike, he invokes his account of liberty in its ‘proper 
sense’, as ‘corporall Liberty; that is to say, freedome from chains, and prison’ 
as well as the suggestion that the subject has authorised the laws to which he 
is subject, and is therefore to an important degree his own governor (L, XXI, 
147-8). He also defines the liberties of the subject in what Skinner calls the 
‘purely juridical terms’ of inalienable rights and limits to obligation: since 
people contracted with each other or the commonwealth in order to protect 
themselves, and they are obliged to it only for as long as it can fulfil this end, 
they remain in full possession of their natural rights or ‘true Liberty’ to refuse a 
command wherever obedience would contradict it (L, XXI, 150).53  
 The disagreement between Skinner’s and Pettit’s views on liberty in 
Hobbes is perhaps best explained as that between a primarily expository and 
a primarily analytical account. Seeking to separate out the main strands 
making up Hobbes’s usage of the term, however, Pettit draws on an analytical 
distinction of Skinner’s own making: ‘obstruction represents loss of liberty in 
“the sphere of nature”; obligation the loss of liberty in “the sphere of artifice”’.54 
The sphere of nature would appear from this to be the physical realm of 
bodies in motion, while that of artifice would seem to be the world of rights, 
agreements and obligations. If this is the case, though, the liberty of the 
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subject in the sphere of artifice is primarily a matter of natural fact, what 
Hobbes actually calls in Leviathan ‘natural liberty’ (L, XXI, 147), while freedom 
in the sphere of nature is principally a juridical status, precisely the 
plenitudinous possession of a ‘natural right’ that survives residually for every 
subject after covenants have been made. It is worth noting, in this connection, 
that the chapter that aims to set out the Hobbesian account of the liberty of 
the subject is also that in which the fullest account of ‘corporall’ or physical 
liberty is to be found. The theory of human liberty in Hobbes would on this 
evidence appear to be somewhat convoluted: not confused, in the sense of 
logically discontinuous or incoherent, but precisely – as Arendt claimed of the 
modern conception of human and civil rights – perplexed. 
 The liberty of the exile or ex-subject of which Hobbes so insistently 
speaks is itself an instance of this, and it restates the interpenetrations of 
physical and juridical, natural and civil (these only insecure oppositions, as 
should be evident by now, are not synonymous) that have been noted in 
earlier sections of this essay. The passage from chapter XXI of Leviathan 
cited above mobilises the distinction between liberty as non-obligation and as 
non-obstruction to make its point: if life and ‘corporall Libertie’ are given to an 
ex-subject by a power with which he is confronted in return for his subjection 
to this power, then ‘he hath Libertie to accept the condition’ (L, XXI, 154). This 
can best make sense if the latter kind of liberty is not here synonymous with 
the former, if indeed it is precisely the freedom of those who have been 
released from their prior obligations to take up new ones and become, in so 
doing, someone else’s subject. By the same token, only if this kind of liberty is 
at least partly a freedom from obligation can its invocation by Hobbes in his 
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own defence actually serve to refute his accusers. All people free to move 
around and act according to their wills retain the physical liberty to break the 
law, as Hobbes suggests (L, XXI, 146), and both Skinner and Pettit have 
pointed out;55 yet when he insists against Wallis that he and other Royalists 
were at liberty to submit to their conquerors, he must be making a juridical 
claim. Anything else would not cut the exculpatory mustard. Stripped of the 
status of subject, the natural human revealed is only more insistently the focus 
for a language of liberty-as-right. Yet this liberty is also a mark of their 
vulnerability, the risk that their freedom to exercise their powers will be 
abruptly curtailed by confinement or death. 
Equally significant, however, is the way in which this liberty is 
generated through the projection of subjects into a post-civil state. These 
humans are therefore testament to a temporality of subjection, a difference 
between before and after, that is itself a transition across the conceptual 
boundaries between natural and civil, physical and juridical; their identities 
bear the marks of these differences and of this temporality, allowing Hobbes’s 
readers to see this as a narrative of political metamorphosis in which 
conceptual oppositions and relations can be explored. And insofar as these 
oppositions are convoluted, then those identified by them appear to perplex 
the philosophical project of which they are a part. In this way exiles, like other 
ex-subjects, are a defining case for the intelligibility and applicability of political 
and juridical categories, and their value as such a case depends on their 
being deprived of the less obviously fraught or ambiguous political identity 
conferred by membership of the commonwealth. Exposed in this way, 
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humanly at risk, the stakes of the commonwealth appear in the starkest 
possible form. From this perspective the Hobbesian exile animates, however 
fleetingly, a problem of political definition that can certainly claim affinity with 
modern and contemporary worries about the relationship between the citizen 
and the outsider. 
